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1Abstract
This paper traces the path of a chemical compound (gamma-hydroxybutyrate, or GHB) from its status as
an abused street drug to that of a legitimate, life-altering prescription treatment for a debilitating condition.
It is the story of the public and private sectors working hand-in-hand to both protect the public from
the detrimental eﬀects of abuse while simultaneously ensuring that the thousands of Americans who need
treatment are able to get it. It is also the story of an administrative and legislative system which, at least
in this instance, seems to have worked to almost everyone’s satisfaction, despite the number of competing
interests that were at stake.
At the same time, this paper does not attempt to explain or evaluate medical claims about GHB or Xyrem.
Instead, it is a historical account of the administrative and legislative path that led to GHB’s approval as a
treatment for cataplexy related to narcolepsy. However, the paper does not take a linear approach to GHB’s
history; instead the administrative and legislative processes are treated separately. Although the processes
inﬂuenced each other in a myriad of ways, they were also distinct enough to require separate discussion.
The story of Congress’ unprecedented bifurcated scheduling was surely a result, in part, of the success of
Orphan’s clinical trials and pending New Drug Application (“NDA”), and the NDA was only allowed to go
forward because of the bifurcated scheduling. Yet, to completely integrate the two stories would be needlessly
confusing to the reader.
2(Samantha Reid) and two friends, none of them yet 16, were at a party given
by a 25 year-old man in Woodhaven, Michigan. Samantha Reid drank a Mountain Dew–
a soft drink–and passed out within minutes. She vomited in her sleep, and she died. Her
friend, Melanie Sindone, also 15, passed out as well. Melanie lapsed into a coma, but
she has survived.
These two girls had no reason to believe that they were drinking anything dangerous.
But they were wrong. Their drinks had been laced with the drug GHB, commonly known
as a date rape drug.” Samantha was undoubtedly slipped it for the purpose that this
name suggests, although she died before that purpose was accomplished.
...GHB and its analogues are becoming increasingly common in our nation. They are
ﬁnding their way into nightclubs, onto campuses and into homes. They are being used by
sexual predators against young–sometimes very young–women. Their unwitting victims
may be raped, become violently ill, and even die.”
- Spencer Abraham, United States Senator1
“My cataplexy caused numerous daily episodes of complete body collapse,
such that I couldn’t leave my oﬃce or home without risk of harm to myself or others.
Feeling any emotion, humor, anger or mere enthusiasm, would result in sudden immediate
collapse...My best description of the sudden collapse of cataplexy would be to imagine a
puppet on strings and suddenly the strings, which are your muscle tone, are immediately
let go and so you fall to the ground immediately, and your head comes down last and
whips against whatever – sidewalk or table corner or escalator or whatever might be
there. I have been rescued by police and emergency squads and life guards and well-
meaning strangers and friends...I do know others whose fall has occurred at the top of
the stairs and they fell down backwards and killed themselves.
...In 1982 my treating physician sent me to Sunnybrook Medical Center in
Toronto, Canada to begin prescriptive use of Xyrem...my severe cataplexy symptoms
disappeared almost overnight.”
- Bob Cloud, narcolepsy/cataplexy patient2
2Bob Cloud, Testimony before the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory
Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt).
3Introduction
Narcolepsy is a rare disease that aﬀects about 140,000 Americans, which is about.05% of the population.3 It
is characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness, cataplexy, sleep paralysis, and hypnagogic hallucinations4
which may represent the outward manifestations of a disrupted sleep cycle.5 Cataplexy is the second most
common form of narcolepsy and aﬀects about 30%-50% of patients, or about 24,000 people.6 It is charac-
terized by the loss of skeletal muscle tone without loss of consciousness.7 Attacks are frequently prompted
by laughter, embarrassment, social interactions with strangers, sudden anger, athletic exertion or sexual
intercourse.8 A cataplexy attack is diﬀerent than the regular sleep attacks that aﬀect most narcoleptics –
instead of simply falling asleep, patients experience “bilateral skeletal muscle weakness.”9 “Partial cataplexy
attacks may involve only certain muscle groups, resulting in head drooping or knee buckling; complete cata-
plexy attacks may involve total skeletal muscle atonia, resulting in collapse” accompanied by an inability to
move.10 At the same time, while suﬀering a cataplexy attack, patients maintain all forms of consciousness,
including the ability to hear, see, and understand what is happening around them.11 Such a condition is
clearly debilitating and frequent attacks can have a devastating eﬀect on patient’s personal and professional
lives.12 They cannot sustain regular social interactions because the slightest change in emotion may trigger
3David E. Fuller and Carl S. Hornfeldt, From Club Drug to Orphan Drug: Sodium Oxybate (Xyrem) for the Treatment of
Cataplexy, 23(9) Pharmacotherapy 2003, 1205, 1205 (2003).
4Hypnagogic hallucinations are dreams that occur during the very early stages of sleep, when people feel as though
they are still awake. Daniel DeNoon, What Dreams May Come Come Not From Waking Memory, WebMD, available at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/28/1728 62251.htm (Feb. 24, 2004).
5Fuller and Hornfeldt, supra note 3, at 1205.
6Id.; Dayton Reardon, Testimony before the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs
Advisory Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt).
7Jerome Siegel, Narcolepsy, Scientific American, Jan. 2000, at 76
8Id.
9Fuller and Hornfeldt, supra note 3, at 1205.
10Id. at 1205-06
11Id.
12See, e.g. Sharon Fitzgerald, Bob Cloud, Richard Gelula, Testimony before the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at
4an attack, the mildest of which usually do not go unnoticed.13 Moreover, they face risks of injury upon
collapse such as hitting one’s head on hard surfaces or falling down a ﬂight of stairs.14
There is no known cure for narcolepsy or cataplexy.15 While anti-depressants are sometimes prescribed
oﬀ-label in order to treat cataplexy, this treatment is often unsatisfactory for patients because tolerance
may develop and, upon sudden withdrawal of the drugs, the frequency and severity of cataplexy attacks
sometimes increase.16 Orphan Medical, Inc. (“Orphan”) has developed the “ﬁrst and only FDA-approved
medication for the treatment of cataplexy associated with narcolepsy.”17 The drug, marketed under the
trade name Xyrem, is sodium oxybate, a sodium salt of gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB),18 and does not
result in tolerance19 or result in adverse eﬀects upon sudden cessation of treatment.20
Because GHB’s history as an abused drug is well-documented, a short summary of that history will suﬃce
for this paper.21 GHB was ﬁrst “marketed as an unregulated dietary supplement in health food stores,
training gyms, and ﬁtness centers, and on the Internet during the 1980s...taken to enhance body building
and strength training...as a natural treatment for insomnia, and to induce weight loss.”22 Although banned
by FDA in 1990, by that time “GHB had developed notoriety as a substance of abuse” at dance clubs and
parties, supposedly producing feelings of “disinhibition, sexual arousal, and euphoria.”23 GHB “was also
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt).
13Id.
14Bob Cloud, Testimony before the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory
Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt).
15Fuller and Hornfeldt, supra note 3, at 1206.
16Id.
17Overview for Healthcare Professionals, at http://xyrem.info/overviewhp.htm.
18Id.
19Telephone Interview with Bob Cloud, Fmr. Director, Narcolepsy Network (Mar. 4, 2004). [hereinafter Bob Cloud Interview]
20U. S. Xyrem Multi-Center Study Group, The Abrupt Cessation of Therapeutically Administered Sodium Oxybate GHB
Does Not Cause Withdrawal Symptoms, 41(2) Journal of Toxicology: Clinical Toxicology, 131 (2003).
21For a fuller discussion of the history of GHB, see Fuller and Hornfeldt, supra note 3.; and Office of Nat’l Drug Control
Policy, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse Fact Sheet: Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate (GHB) (November 2002).
22Fuller and Hornfeldt, supra note 3, at 1206.
23Id. at 1207
5implicated in an increasing number of drug-facilitated sexual assaults” due to its ability to cause “anterograde
amnesia, especially when combined with ethanol, leaving the assault victim unable to recall details of the
event.”24 This led to GHB’s label as a “date-rape” drug.25 At the same time, “an increasing number of
people taking GHB experienced overdose requiring hospital emergency care.” 26 “Abuse of GHB can cause
serious medical problems, including trouble breathing, seizures (convulsions), loss of consciousness, coma,
and death,” and “could also lead to dependence, craving...and severe withdrawal symptoms.”27 Concerns
about rising GHB abuse led the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to ban its use in 1990,28 and
Congress to list it as a schedule I drug in 2000.29
This is the story of GHB’s path to legitimacy – how it came to be approved as a treatment for cataplexy
associated with narcolepsy distributed under what are arguably the tightest controls of any prescription drug
on the market.
The Orphan Drug Act and FDA Approval
The story of GHB’s path to legitimacy begins in January 1983, when President Ronald Reagan signed the
Orphan Drug Act (PL 97-414) into law.30 The Act was designed to encourage the development of what were
24Id.
25Id.
26Id.
27Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Xyrem (sodium oxybate) Oral Solution Medication Guide (July 17, 2002) available
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/xyrem/medicationguide.htm.
28Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, BD, GBL, and GHB Poster (May 6, 2003) available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/ghb-poster.htm.
29Hillory J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-172. This Act provided
for the bifurcated scheduling of GHB and a GHB drug product approved by FDA. This is discussed in detail in the section on
legislation, below.
30Maeder, Thomas, The Orphan Drug Backlash, Scientific American, May 2003, at 80, 83. This article also gives an
interesting critique of the orphan drug designation and points to those drugs which were developed under the Orphan Drug
Act incentives but then turn out to have much more widespread applications than initially thought. If Xyrem turns out to be
eﬀective in treating ﬁbromyalgia and other conditions for which it is currently being studied (see discussion at the end of this
paper), Orphan Medical and Xyrem may be subject to criticisms similar to those discussed by Maeder.
6termed “orphan drugs.”31 Originally deﬁned as a drug which could not reasonably be expected to recover
development costs through US sales, a 1984 amendment allowed a presumption that such designation applied
to any drug anticipated to treat fewer than 200,000 patients.32 The Act, as amended, gives several incentives
to companies in order to promote development of orphan drugs, including a 50 percent tax credit on all clinical
trial costs, exemption from paying the “user fee” (currently $533,400) that the FDA usually charges drug
sponsors, and bars other ﬁrms from obtaining FDA approval for the same drug for seven years.33 Indeed,
“FDA can approve the same drug made by a prospective competitor only if it is ‘clinically superior’ - if the
product is safer, more eﬀective or easier to take.”34 An added, unoﬃcial beneﬁt for orphan drug sponsors
is a closer working relationship with FDA, to the point where FDA will often assist in the design of the
statistically meaningful clinical trials which are more diﬃcult for rare disorders.35 The program has been
remarkably eﬀective at encouraging development of orphan drugs, with one 2003 report stating that “229
orphan drugs that together treat 11 million patients, most with serious or life-threatening diseases, are now
on the market.”36
At the Congressional hearings on the Orphan Drug Act, GHB as a possible treatment for symptoms of
narcolepsy was held up as a prime example of a drug no company was willing to investigate without the
incentives provided by the Orphan Drug Act.37 FDA began publishing a “cumulative list of orphan drug
designations” in 1985 in order to give notice of those drugs which are “designated orphan drugs and biolog-
ical products,”38 and GHB ﬁrst appeared on that list in 1986 (after being designated as an orphan drug in
1985) as a possible treatment for “narcolepsy and the auxiliary symptoms of cataplexy, sleep paralysis, hyp-
31Pub. L. No. 97-414, §1.
32See Maeder supra note 30, at 83.
33Id.
34Id.
35Id.
36Id. at 82.
37Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
38See, e.g. 51 FR 3844-02 and 52 FR 3778-01.
7nagogic hallucinations, and automatic behavior.”39 GHB was already being studied in Canada as a possible
treatment for narcolepsy indications,40 and in the United States, Dr. Martin Scharf, currently Executive
Director of the Tri-State Sleep Disorder Clinic in Cincinnati, OH, had ﬁled for and received a treatment
Investigational New Drug Application (“Treatment IND”) in 1983.41 In 1985 Dr. Scharf published a report
on the open label trial he was conducting which established the safety and eﬃcacy of GHB as a treatment
for narcolepsy indications,42 though as Dr. Scharf concedes, because his was an open label trial – meaning
no placebos were used – the report was of limited utility in the development of the drug.43 Subsequently,
because of the high cost associated with a treatment IND for which he was not charging patients for access
to the drugs, Dr. Scharf began cooperating with Biocraft, a generic drug company which had registered its
intent to research GHB as an orphan drug product with the FDA.44 However, after Biocraft was acquired
by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, it became focused on generic drug manufacturing and less interested in
drug development, and thus abandoned its investigation of GHB.45
Orphan Medical, Inc. (“Orphan”) was approached by FDA Oﬃce of Orphan Products in 1994 to begin
investigation into the possible use of GHB as a treatment for narcolepsy.46 Orphan “acquires, develops,
3951 FR 3844-02 (Table).
40See, e.g. Mamelak M, Escriu JM, Stokan O. The eﬀects of Gamma-hydroxybutyrate on sleep. Biological Psychiatry
1977;12:273-88.
41Telephone Interview with Dr. Martin Scharf, Executive Director, Tri-State Sleep Disorder Clinic (April 7, 2004) [hereinafter
Martin Scharf Interview]; There are three types of INDs: 1) An Investigator IND, submitted by a physician who both initiates
and conducts an investigation, and under whose immediate direction the investigational drug is administered or dispensed. A
physician might submit a research IND to propose studying an unapproved drug, or an approved product for a new indication
or in a new patient population; 2) Emergency Use IND, which allows the FDA to authorize use of an experimental drug in
an emergency situation that does not allow time for submission of an IND in accordance with 21CFR , Sec. 312.23 or Sec.
312.34. It is also used for patients who do not meet the criteria of an existing study protocol, or if an approved study protocol
does not exist; and 3) Treatment INDs, submitted for experimental drugs showing promise in clinical testing for serious or
immediately life-threatening conditions while the ﬁnal clinical work is conducted and the FDA review takes place, and which
are used to make promising new drugs available to desperately ill patients as early in the drug development process as possible.
– Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application Process (Jan. 20, 2004) at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/ind page 1.htm; Food and Drug Administration, Treatment IND, available
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/treatind.htm.
42Scharf, M., Brown, D., Woods, M., Brown, L., and Hirschowitz J. The eﬀects and eﬀectiveness of gamma-hydroxybutyrate
in patients with narcolepsy, Journal of Clinical Psychiatry (1985) 46:222-225.
43Martin Scharf Interview, supra note 41.
44Id.
45Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
46Telephone Interview with Dayton Reardon, Vice-President of Regulatory Aﬀairs, Orphan Medical, Inc. (Mar. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Dayton Reardon Interview].
8and markets products of high medical value that address inadequately treated or uncommon diseases within
selected market segments;” according to the company, “a drug has high medical value if it oﬀers a major
improvement on the safety or eﬃcacy of patient treatment and has no substantially equivalent substitute.”
47 In essence, it is a drug company devoted to the development of orphan drugs, and currently has seven
drugs on the market with NDAs approved by FDA.48 The FDA chose Orphan almost “by default” after the
other companies decided not to move forward with development of a GHB drug product because of economic
considerations;49 at the same time, Dr. Scharf oﬀered Orphan all of his data for free if they would agree
to develop the drug product.50 Based in part on that data, as well as on the prior designation of GHB as
an orphan drug, Orphan’s petition for designation of GHB as an orphan drug, ﬁled in 1994, was approved
within two weeks.51 In 1996, two years after being approached by FDA, Orphan ﬁled and received an IND
and began formal development eﬀorts of GHB as a drug product.52
According to a company representative, “the Orphan Drug Act was an incentive in the development of Xyrem. The
compound was in the public domain and without the protection of the Act, it would have been less likely to
be developed.”53 Moreover, a measure of the special relationship accorded to drug companies working under
the Orphan Drug Act by FDA can be seen in Orphan’s experience. The company “worked closely with FDA
for several years on this medication...the Oﬃce of Orphan Products in particular was very supportive and
interested in seeing a company move forward on this project.”54 One clear – and necessary55 – beneﬁt of
47Orphan Medical, Inc., About Orphan Medical, available at http://www.orphan.com/index.cfm?aid=10.
48Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
49Telephone Interview with Dr. John McCormick, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration Oﬃce of Orphan Products
Development (April 19, 2004) [hereinafter John McCormick Interview].
50Martin Scharf Interview, supra note 41.
51According to Dr. Reardon, this was the quickest designation of any drug as an orphan drug product in the program’s
history. Of course, as Dr. Reardon notes, the substance had already been designated as such when Biocraft was researching it,
and the FDA Oﬃce of Orphan Products was quite familiar with the research.
Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
52Id.
53E-mail from David Folken, Senior Corporate Communications Specialist, Orphan Medical, Inc., to Ariel Neuman, Student,
Harvard Law School (Mar. 16, 2004, 09:33:42 CST) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter David Folken Email].
54Id.
55Because, by deﬁnition, an orphan drug is meant to treat only a small population of patients, it is impossible to test the
drugs on the same number of patients normally required by FDA for drug approval.
9designation as an orphan drug in Orphan’s case was that FDA did not require the company to study the
drug in nearly as many patients as is typical in drug development research.56
In December 1998, Orphan was granted a Treatment IND for the study of GHB in treating patients with
narcolepsy and cataplexy.57 Treatment INDs allow the study of potentially useful compounds which do not
yet have enough clinical data to justify an NDA; it is “a mechanism to permit use of an investigational
drug outside the context of a controlled trial for a serious disease for which there aren’t other available
treatments...usually granted relatively late in the development of a drug so that...(there is) some reasonable
idea, based on controlled data, that the drug is probably eﬀective and reasonably well tolerated.”58 In this
case the FDA determined that a single controlled study “supported an eﬀect of GHB” in treating narcolepsy
and cataplexy patients, and Orphan committed to providing a second study as well.59 The Treatment IND
was meant to expand patient access to Xyrem while generating data necessary to support the ﬁling of NDA
for the drug.60 Although Orphan tried to charge patients receiving GHB under the treatment IND, recovery
eﬀorts from patients and insurance companies were “pretty dismal” and did not even cover the costs of the
treatment IND program.61
The IND had the desired eﬀect - by the time Orphan submitted its NDA62 for Xyrem on September 30,
56Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
57Memorandum from Russell Katz, Director of FDA Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, to
Members of FDA Peripheral and Central Nervous Systems Drug Advisory Committee (May 9, 2001) avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/brieﬁng/3754b1 02 section%201.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum]; Food
and Drug Administration, Product Index of Treatment INDs Allowed to Proceed (Sept. 24, 1999) available at
http://www.fda.gov/oashi/patrep/treatind.html#Xyrem.
58Russell Katz, Testimony before the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Ad-
visory Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt)
[hereinafter Katz Testimony].
59Memorandum, supra note 57.
60Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical Initiates XyremTM (sodium oxybate) oral solution Treatment IND
(Feb. 23, 1999) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=175.
61Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
62Food and Drug Administration NDA 21-196
102000, the application included results from four randomized controlled trials, as well as safety data.63 The
NDA requested approval of Xyrem for the treatment of both cataplexy and excessive daytime sleepiness.64
FDA granted the application priority review status,65 a designation which “recognizes the importance of
prompt action to evaluate applications for new drugs which have the potential for important or modest
therapeutic advances”66 and which moves the application to the top of FDA’s pile. Reﬂecting the priority
accorded to Xyrem, FDA scheduled a meeting of the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory
Committee (the “Advisory Committee”) for March 15, 2001, to consider the safety and eﬃcacy of Xyrem.67
In the months leading up to that meeting, however, a number of issues arose. Dr. Deborah Liederman, the
newly appointed Director of Controlled Substances Staﬀ at FDA, brought a new emphasis to the discussion
with a focus on evaluation of safety concerns.68 She and other oﬃcials at FDA began insisting that the
drug come in a formulation with a colorant or ﬂavorant, meant to warn potential victims of date-rape if
Xyrem were slipped into their drink.69 Orphan had previously investigated adding a colorant or ﬂavorant
but found it chemically infeasible, and eventually the chemists and others at FDA agreed.70 In addition,
because Xyrem is meant to be taken in two doses – one before going to bed and another a few hours after
falling asleep71 – and because the second dose must be poured before taking the ﬁrst so that the patient will
not have to get out of bed, concerns arose that the poured second dose would be vulnerable to accidental
ingestion by children.72 As a result, Orphan redesigned the packaging of Xyrem to include two child-proof
63Memorandum, supra note 57.
64Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Xyrem r  NDA for Narcolepsy Symptoms Submitted by Orphan Medical (Oct. 2,
2000) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=203.
65Id.; Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical Receives 90 Day Extension To Xyrem r  New Drug Application
(NDA), (March 30, 2001) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=272.
66Food and Drug Administration, Staﬀ Manual Guide BD4820.3, in Peter Barton Hutt & Richard Merrill, food and
Drug Law: Cases and Materials 529, 531 (2nd ed. 1991).
6766 Fed. Reg. 10305
68Telephone Interview with Dr. Marlene Haﬀner, Director, Food and Drug Administration Oﬃce of Orphan Products
Development (April 19, 2004) [hereinafter Marlene Haﬀner Interview]; Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
69Id..
70Id.
71Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 27.
72Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
11dosing cups, which continue to be included with the product today.73
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee meeting was ultimately postponed when FDA’s Division of Scientiﬁc
Investigations issued ﬁndings which “raised serious questions about the reliability of data” submitted by
Orphan in support of the NDA.74 The data in question was not from those trials conducted by or sponsored
by Orphan,75 but instead was from the trials of Dr. Scharf, the “individual investigator who had treated
about 140 patients under his own IND, and whose data (representing about 1000 patient-years of exposure,
or about 70% of the total patient exposure in the NDA) had been submitted by (Orphan) in support of the
safety of GHB.”76 In particular, the investigators were unable to locate “critical source documents of Dr.
Scharf’s IND.”77 This source data consisted in large part of information on adverse events with 80 patients
who were no longer under Dr. Scharf’s care and whose current locations were largely unknown.78 This
problem arose in large part because Dr. Scharf’s data covered 16-17 years of data for 120 patients around
the country, under an open label study in which he had not kept formal case-report forms; Dr. Scharf points
out that in essence FDA was holding his data which dated back to 1983 to a 2001 standard.79 FDA contended,
however, that no matter when the data was produced, one had to measure safety and eﬃcacy by the most
up-to-date standards.80 Thus, because Dr. Scharf’s data comprised almost 30 percent of the patient safety
database in the NDA,81 Orphan was forced to undertake “a detailed and extensive review of Dr. Scharf’s
records, in an attempt to validate the presentation of this data...(and ﬁle) an amendment which contained a
re-analysis of the data from Dr. Scharf’s study.”82 Dr. Scharf also made “extensive eﬀorts” to provide the
73Id.
74Memorandum, supra note 57.
75Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical Reports on Xyrem NDA Developments (Mar. 1, 2001) available at
http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=269.
76Memorandum, supra note 57.
77Katz Testimony, supra note 58.
78Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46. The safety information from the patients still under Dr. Scharf’s care was
available and apparently satisfactory for FDA.
79Martin Scharf Interview, supra note 41.
80Marlene Haﬀner Interview, supra note 68.
81Katz Testimony, supra note 58.
82Memorandum, supra note 57.
12additional source documents, and once FDA investigators reexamined the data with the missing material
now included, they concluded that “the records, for the most part, do support the sponsor’s descriptions of
Dr. Scharf’s data” – that GHB was relatively safe for use as a treatment of cataplexy.83 Nonetheless, the
delay and required submission of an amendment to the original NDA resulted in an extension of the original
due date for the application, and the rescheduling of the Advisory Committee meeting to June 6, 2001.84
At that meeting, the Advisory Committee examined both the clinical studies and the proposed risk manage-
ment program.85 It considered testimony from Orphan, FDA, outside experts on both GHB and risk man-
agement, patients, patient advocates, drug diversion specialists, and opponents of any GHB drug product.86
FDA originally asked the Advisory Committee to vote on three questions: 1) whether or not substantial
evidence of eﬀectiveness had been submitted for the indication for cataplexy and excessive daytime sleepiness
in patients with narcolepsy; 2) whether or not GHB can be considered safe in use given appropriate labeling
if the Advisory Committee found that there is substantial evidence of eﬀectiveness for only a particular
indication; and 3) whether or not it is required or should be required that the drug be approved only with
the risk management program of some type (not necessarily the one speciﬁcally proposed by the company).87
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee actually took a number of votes, the results of which are laid out in
the table below.88
Question Yes No Abstentions
83Katz Testimony, supra note 58.
84Memorandum, supra note 57.
85Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript
(June 6, 2001) (available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt) [hereinafter Transcript].
86Id. The slides from the presentations made to the FDA Advisory Committee are available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3754s1.htm.
87Katz Testimony, supra note 58.
88Note: only those questions where votes were counted and reported are included. Except where noted, all information in
this table is taken from Final Minutes of the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drug
Advisory Committee of June 6, 2001 (available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/minutes/3754m1.htm).
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89This vote is not included in the Advisory Committee’s Final Minutes. It is indicated, however, in the Transcript,
supra Note 85, and is reported at Press Release, Orphan Medical Inc., Orphan Medical, Inc. Announces FDA Advi-
sory Committee Finds Xyrem r  Eﬀective For Treating Cataplexy Associated With Narcolepsy (June 6, 2001) available at
http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=286.
14Has
the
spon-
sor
demon-
strated
ef-
ﬁ-
cacy
(at
6
–
9
grams)
of
Xyrem
for
the
pro-
posed
in-
di-
ca-
tion
of
day-
time
sleepi-
ness?
0 9 —
Has the sponsor established the safety of
Xyrem when used for the proposed indication
for which substantial evidence of eﬀectiveness
has been submitted?90
4 4 1
90This was only voted on in terms of cataplexy and with a dose range of 6-9grams/day.
15Is
the
adop-
tion
of
a
risk
man-
age-
ment
plan
nec-
es-
sary
for
the
safe
use
of
Xyrem?
8 1 —
Should there be a requirement for additional
safeguards in patient’s homes, e.g., keeping
drugs in a locked storage space?
1 8 —
Should patients sign an informed consent
form before receiving the initial shipment of
the drug?
5 4 —
Should physicians document that they read
the materials sent to them before the
pharmacy ﬁlls the initial prescription?
7 2 —
Should physicians be required to demonstrate
safe use and appropriate dosage preparation
to patients before the ﬁrst prescription and
be required to document that it has been
accomplished?91
1 7 1
Should there be restricted prescribing for the
product? (e.g., only to those who have a
diagnosis of cataplexy)
7 1 1
Should certiﬁcation of physicians for
prescribing Xyrem be required?
0 8 1
Thus, the Advisory Committee recommended that Xyrem be approved only for the treatment of cataplexy,
91The word physician staﬀ was added to the sentence.
16and that it must be accompanied by a comprehensive risk management program.
On July 2, 2001, FDA determined that Xyrem was approvable for the indication of cataplexy related to
narcolepsy.92 However, it would be a full year before Xyrem was approved for sale.93 FDA ﬁrst sent an
Approvable Letter to Orphan stating that, before ﬁnal approval of the Xyrem NDA, FDA required a safety
update of on-going clinical trials, an additional acute exposure trial in respiratory compromised patients,
deﬁnition of ﬁnal product labeling, minor modiﬁcations to the proposed risk management program, and
that Orphan undergo a successful good manufacturing practices (GMP) re-inspection and a pre-approval
inspection relating to manufacture of Xyrem.94 Although Orphan tried to respond to FDA’s concerns with
its NDA Amendment of October 9, 2001,95 FDA sent another approvable letter in April 2002, requiring
further clariﬁcation of respiratory data and revisions to labeling.96 In addition, FDA indicated that it would
conduct additional clinical trial site review, which it eventually completed but about which it issued no
ﬁndings.97 Orphan responded again on May 17,98 and FDA accepted the response and set July 17, 2002, as
the action goal for the approval of Xyrem.99 During this year-long process, according to Dayton Reardon,
Orphan’s vice-president for regulatory aﬀairs, the “NDA was put under extraordinary scrutiny...there was
not a single piece of paper that was left unturned” and FDA examined every case report for every patient.100
92Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical, Inc. Receives FDA Approvable Letter for Xyrem r  (July 3, 2001)
available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=288.
93Xyrem Clinical Development, Biospace, at http://www.biospace.com/ccis/detail.cfm?ClinicalID=715.
94Orphan, at the time of the Approvable Letter, was subject to a warning letter from the FDA with respect to GMP not
related to Xyrem, which was the reason for the GMP requirements. Press Release supra note 92.
95Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical, Inc. Submits Complete Response To The Xyrem r  (Sodium Oxybate)
NDA Approvable Letter, (Oct. 9, 2001) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=294.
96Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical, Inc. Submits A Complete Response To The Xyrem r  (Sodium
Oxybate) NDA Approvable Letter (May 17, 2002) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=320.
97Id.
98In that response Orphan made the requested changing to its labeling, changes which it did not think were necessary and
with which it still does not agree. – Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
99Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical, Inc. Release: Xyrem r  Response Accepted By FDA For Review
(May 23, 2002) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=323.
100Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
17On July 17, 2002, FDA announced its approval of Xyrem for treating “patients with narcolepsy who experi-
ence episodes of cataplexy.”101 The FDA did so while adopting all of the Advisory Committee’s recommen-
dations except a restriction on oﬀ-label prescribing; this violated FDA’s long-standing policy of declining to
interfere with “the practice of medicine.”102 The approval was made under 21 CFR 314 Subpart H, which
provides for the accelerated approval of new drugs for serious or life-threatening illnesses.103 Subpart H,
passed in 1992, was originally a response to the AIDS epidemic,104 but has since been used to approve at
least 49 NDAs for various indications.105 The Subpart allows for “marketing approval for a new drug product
on the basis of adequate and well-controlled clinical trials establishing that the drug product has an eﬀect
on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely, based on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic, or
other evidence, to predict clinical beneﬁt;” in essence meaning the drug can be approved with less clinical
data than normal, though with the requirement of further study of eﬃcacy and safety.106 A less frequently
used application of Subpart H also allows FDA to place restrictions on the distribution and marketing of
the approved drug in order to assure “safe use” and to expedite withdrawal of approval upon speciﬁc ﬁnd-
ings.107 Xyrem was approved both based on a surrogate endpoint and with restrictions on distribution and
marketing.108
101Food and Drug Administration, FDA Talk Paper: FDA Approves Xyrem for Cataplexy Attacks in Patients with Nar-
colepsy,” (July 17, 2002) at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2002/ans01157.html
102Not only did this recommendation violate FDA policy, but it was most likely not a legally defensible position for FDA to
take, according to the agency’s general counsel oﬃce. John McCormick Interview, supra note 49.
103Letter from Dr. Robert Temple, Director of Oﬃce of Drug Evaluation I, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to
Dayton Reardon, Vice-President of Regulatory Aﬀairs, Orphan Medical, Inc. (July 17, 2002) [hereinafter Temple Letter].
104Susan B. Anthony List, Cutting Corners, Risking Lives: How the Clinton FDA Endangered Women by Rushing Approval
of RU-486, at http://www.sba-list.org/RU-486.htm.
105Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, NDAs Approved Under Subpart H, (Sept. 30,
2003) at http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/accapp.htm.
10621 CFR 314.510
10721 CFR 314.500-560
108Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
18Orphan initially resisted eﬀorts to have the drug approved under Subpart H; it believed that the risk manage-
ment program it had voluntarily devised was suﬃcient, it did not like the possibility of expedited withdrawal,
and it feared the restrictions on marketing that came with approval under Subpart H.109 Those restrictions
included a requirement that all promotional materials be submitted to FDA 30 days prior to use,110 and thus
does not allow a company to “push the boundaries” of allowable advertising that normal, ex post FDA-review
permits.111 FDA in this instance also required the adoption of the risk management program which Orphan
had devised, distribution to patients of a “medication guide” along with the drug, at least three speciﬁed
post-marketing clinical studies, submission of the ﬁnal printed label which had previously been agreed upon
by FDA and Orphan, and updates to FDA every three months.112 While unusual – only ﬁve other NDAs
approved under Subpart H have had restrictions on distribution113 – these restrictions, explained in detail
below, reﬂected the desire to get the drug to patients as quickly as possible while ensuring safe distribution
and use of Xyrem. The approval under Subpart H represented an agreement between the Orphan and FDA
that the risk management program would be instituted.114
Congress Takes Action
In the midst of this development process, FDA and Orphan faced an unexpected challenge – from Congress.
Following the 1990 FDA ban on the sale of GHB, momentum began to build for Congressional action. A spike
109Id.
110Promotional materials to be used within the ﬁrst 120 days must be submitted to FDA prior to approval. Promotional
material used after the 120 day period need only be submitted 30 days in advance of use. 21 CFR 315.550
111Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
112Temple Letter, supra note 103. The details of FDA’s requirements for distribution of Xyrem are available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2002/21196lbl.pdf. The risk management program, as adopted, is also described in de-
tail later in this paper.
113Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, NDAs Approved Under Subpart H, (Sept. 30,
2003) at http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/accapp.htm.
114John McCormick Interview, supra note 49.
19in reported deaths from GHB overdoses, as well as an increased number of both violent and non-violent date-
rapes involving GHB, prompted members of Congress to begin seeking to list GHB as a Schedule I controlled
substance.115 According to one sponsor of the ﬁnal Congressional legislation speaking in 2000, “The abuse,
traﬃcking, and diversion of GHB is rapidly increasing. The Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
has documented nearly 6,000 encounters of GHB. Deaths from the drug are escalating rapidly, from one in
1990 to 17 last year, for a total of 58 deaths. Emergency room episodes resulting from the use of the drug
are also escalating rapidly, from 20 in 1992 to 762 in 1997, the last year for which data is available, for a
total of more than 1,600 episodes;” Congressional action was ﬁnally “sparked by the death of two young,
wonderful women, one in Texas and one in Michigan, whose drinks were spiked with GHB. Since then,
ﬁve more women have died in Texas and another two in Michigan.”116 The DEA was also pushing for the
scheduling of GHB as a Schedule I substance,117 pointing out in testimony before Congress that between
1993 and 1999 “more than 3,500 GHB-related cases of abuse, overdose, possession, illegal manufacturing,
illicit diversion and traﬃcking (were) documented by Federal, state and local oﬃcials.”118
As public pressure increased, the ﬁrst bill attempting to criminalize the production, use, and sale of GHB was
introduced in 1997.119 This bill, introduced by Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX), was a straight-
forward attempt to ban GHB – it simply added GHB to the list of Schedule I drugs under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812) and directed the Attorney General to “establish programs throughout the
United States and disseminate materials to provide young people in high school and college with education
about the use of controlled substances in the furtherance of rape and sexual assault.”120 The bill was referred
115146 Cong Rec H 55
116146 Cong Rec H 55 – Comments by Cong. Upton
117Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
118Terrance Woodworth, Deputy Director, Oﬃce of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, Testimony Be-
fore the: House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (March 11, 1999) (available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct990311.htm).
119105 H.R. 1530 (“The Hillory J. Farias Date Rape Prevention Drug Act”)
120Id. at §3
20to the House Commerce Committee and House Judiciary Committee, but no further action was taken during
the 105th Congress.121 Representative Jackson-Lee reintroduced her legislation during the 106th Congress
as 106 H.R. 75, but by this point it appears that momentum had shifted from an outright ban on GHB
to the bifurcated scheduling that eventually became law. While the original Jackson-Lee bill had thirteen
co-sponsors, the re-introduced bill had none.122
Instead, after lobbying by Orphan and various narcolepsy patient interest groups,123 the Congressional spon-
sors decided that they should attempt “to fashion a remedy (to GHB abuse) without limiting its potential
for medical use for the beneﬁt of society.”124 Patient groups, such as the Narcolepsy Network, viewed the
pure Schedule I listing of GHB as “extremely unfortunate,” and worked with Orphan to convince legislators
that a door must be left open for the possible use of GHB as a treatment for cataplexy.125 Orphan in fact
believed that GHB should be either a Schedule IV or unscheduled substance, but found this position to be
untenable in the face of DEA opposition.126
Orphan took the lead on pushing for some sort of compromise solution.127 It took a lesson from what it be-
lieved were the mistakes made by Hoﬀman-LaRouche, the manufacturer of Rohypnol (ﬂunitrazepam), during
negotiations regarding The Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996 (Pub. L.104-305).128
According to Orphan’s consultants, Hoﬀman-LaRouche had initially held discussions and negotiations with
law-enforcement and rape-crisis advocates, as well as other stakeholders, about a compromise scheduling for
ﬂunitrazepam, only to do an “end-run” around them on the ﬂoor of the house and have the compound remain
121143 Cong Rec H 2168
122105 H.R. 1530; 106 H.R. 75
123FDA was not involved in any lobbying eﬀorts because it is prohibited by law from lobbying Congress. – Marlene Haﬀner
Interview, supra note 68.
124Telephone Interview with Bart Stupak, United States Representative, Michigan District 1 (Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Bart
Stupak Interview].
125Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
126Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46. According to Dr. Reardon, the DEA insisted on a Schedule I designation.
127David Folken Email, supra note 53; Telephone interview with Bob Gagne, Strategic and Crisis Consultant, Colle + McVoy
Public Aﬀairs (April 8, 2004) [hereinafter Bob Gagne Interview].
128Id.
21a Schedule IV substance but with Schedule I penalties for illicit use and distribution.129 This left the stake-
holders with a deep distrust of drug companies and made Orphan’s job even more diﬃcult.130 Thus Orphan
adopted a strategy whereby it became an ally of the stakeholders, pushing for the controls that they wanted
while at the same time educating them about the potential beneﬁts of pharmaceutical GHB.131 Beginning in
1999, Orphan representatives met with prosecutors, rape-crisis advocates, law-enforcement representatives,
and other stakeholders in order to learn their concerns and desires and in an attempt to establish a rapport
of mutual good will.132 At the meetings, Orphan attempted to built bridges of trust between the company
and those who were concerned about abuse and illicit use of GHB, thereby allowing the stakeholders to
support Orphan’s eﬀorts because Orphan was supporting theirs.133 These conversations eventually led to
both Orphan and the stakeholders pushing for provisions that made it into the ﬁnal bill, such as the listing
of GBL, a GHB analogue, as a controlled substance, the development of GHB ﬁeld-test kits for use by law
enforcement, and better, coordinated investigation techniques for drug-related date rapes.134 Thus Orphan
was able to count these stakeholders as allies as it began its direct lobbying of Congress; its strategy boiled
down to pushing for greater controls of GHB’s illicit use, with an almost incidental inclusion of an exception
for the development of an FDA-approved drug product.135
At the same time, Orphan helped organize and fund correspondence, testimony, and meetings between
narcoleptics who might beneﬁt from prescription GHB and the various state and federal legislators working
on the issue.136 Orphan was concerned that “as a responsible public company, it would need to halt its
129Id.; Pub. L. 104-305
130Bob Gagne Interview, supra note 127.
131Id.
132Id.
133Id.
134Id.; Pub. L. 106-172
135Bob Gagne Interview, supra note 127.
136Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
22research if (GHB) were placed (only) in schedule I.”137 The company did its own direct lobbying, educating
the sponsors of the Congressional legislation on the debilitating eﬀects of cataplexy and narcolepsy, as well as
the potential beneﬁts to the patients of prescription GHB.138 It argued that “the problem of GHB abuse was
due to criminals making the compound illegally, and by making GHB a schedule I substance it was unlikely
that people breaking the law already would suddenly stop...Thus, the problem of GHB abuse would likely
still be there but the hope of a legitimate medication may well disappear.”139 Meanwhile, FDA recognized
that GHB “needed to be scheduled in order to deal with the misuse of the product that was being made in
bathtubs and to get precursors of the product out of the system,” while recognizing the important of the
development of a GHB drug-product.140 Although it is not clear which division at FDA initially came up
with the suggestion, on May 19, 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services, which houses FDA,
recommended a dual scheduling of GHB, recommending that GHB be scheduled in Schedule I of the CSA
and the GHB prescription drug product be scheduled in Schedule III if studied under a FDA authorized
Investigational New Drug (IND) exemption.141 Orphan accepted this suggestion because the bifurcated
scheduling was “a good win-win solution which allowed for the continued development of an important
medication while still allowing for, and encouraging, strong prosecution of anyone that would misuse the
compound.”142
The death of Samantha Reid in 1999 in Michigan was a deﬁning factor in the scheduling of GHB.143 The use
of the drug in the attempted rape of a ﬁfteen year old galvanized the Michigan delegation to Congress.144
137David Folken Email, supra note 53.
138Bart Stupak Interview, supra note 124.
139David Folken Email, supra note 53.
140John McCormick Interview, supra note 49.
141106 H.Rpt.340; Prt 1; Letter from HHS to DEA, published at 65 Fed. Reg. 13236-37 (March 2000)
142David Folken Email, supra note 53.
143145 Cong Rec S 14870, 14873; 146 Cong Rec H 55, 57.
144Bart Stupak Interview, supra note 124.
23House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chairman Fred Upton’s (R-
MI) district pushed the legislation through the House of Representatives, while Senator Edmond Spencer
Abrahams took the lead in the Senate.145 By this point “At least 20 States (had) scheduled GHB under State
drug control statutes, and law enforcement oﬃcials continue to experience an increased presence of the drug in
sexual assaults, driving under the inﬂuence (DUI) oﬀenses, and overdose cases involving teenagers.”146 The
Subcommittee held a hearing on March 11, 1999, and received testimony from, among others, representatives
of law enforcement agencies, members of Congress, a representative from Orphan, and pharmacologists.147
On June 10, the name of the victim from Representative Upton’s district, Samantha Reid, was added to the
legislation and it was introduced as H.R. 2130 in the 106th Congress as the “Hillory J. Farias and Samantha
Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000.”148
Representative Upton was the sponsor with an even bipartisan split of twenty co-sponsors.149 This new
legislation was more complex and nuanced than the original bills introduced by Representative Jackson-Lee.
The House Findings recognized that “A human pharmaceutical formulation of (GHB) is being developed
as a treatment for cataplexy, a serious and debilitating disease.”150 As part of that ﬁnding, 106 H.R. 2130
included the ﬁrst-ever bifurcated scheduling of a substance under the Controlled Substances Act (21 USC
812) (“CSA”). While §3(a) added GHB to the list of Schedule I substances, §3(b) amended the Schedule
III listing to include GHB “and its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers contained in a drug product for
which an application has been approved under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,”
thereby allowing research on medical use of GHB and eventual prescription use of the substance. In an added
145106 H.R. 2130; 106 S. 1561.
146106 H.Rpt. 340; Prt 1.
147Id.
148145 Cong Rec H 4127.
149106 H.R. 2130.
150106 H.R. 2130 §2(5).
24acknowledgment of the dangers of GHB, however, the legislation in §3(e) set forth Schedule I level penalties
for the “unlawful use of an approved drug product that contains GHB;”151 this also was an unprecedented
move, prompted in large part by a desire to further control the spread of GHB and halt its abuse.152
This legislation was only the third time in history that such a bifurcated schedule was attempted. In 1986,
Marinol (and any other drugs of the same formulation approved by FDA), a drug used for treating nausea and
vomiting associated with cancer chemotherapy and which is made from synthetic THC, the active ingredient
in marijuana, was transferred to Schedule II by DEA while marijuana and any other formulations of THC
remained Schedule I substances.153 That bifurcated scheduling, however, was not based on Congressional
action, but instead came as a result of DEA statutory interpretation and petition by FDA and others.154
Unlike the Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act, the administrative ruling regarding Marinol and the Drug-
Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996 (the only other bifurcated scheduling of a substance)
were not attempts to bifurcate the scheduling of a substance in one move. Marijuana was already scheduled
as Schedule I and the administrative ruling simply moved FDA-approved drug products containing synthetic
THC to Schedule II;155 similarly, as previously noted, the Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment
Act of 1996 provided for Schedule I penalties for illicit use of ﬂunitrazepam while maintaining its status as
a Schedule IV substance.156 The Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act, on the other hand, was intended both
to schedule GHB as Schedule I and any GHB drug product as Schedule III, at the same time.157
The legislation was referred to both the House Committee on the Judiciary and to the House Committee
151106 H.Rpt. 340; Prt 1.
152Bart Stupak Interview, supra note 124.
15361 FR 35928.
15451 FR 17476-01.
15551 FR 17476-01. Note: In 1999, the DEA downgraded the scheduling of Marinol and other drug products containing
synthetic THC to Schedule III. 61 FR 35928.
156Pub. L. 104-305.
157106 H.R. 2130.
25on Commerce, the latter of which took control of evaluating and approving the legislation.158 On July 27,
the House Subcommittee on Health and Environment approved the bill for full committee consideration,
and on August 5, the Committee on Commerce ordered the legislation reported to the full House.159 The
report was ﬁled on September 27, and ﬁfteen days later the legislation was approved by the entire House of
Representatives by a vote of 423 to 1.160 Indeed, according to Congressman Bart Stupak (D-MI), one of the
original co-sponsors of the legislation, there was no real opposition at all to the bifurcated scheduling at any
point in the process,161 and indeed, the only Representative to vote nay was Ron Paul (R-TX) who opposed
the entire bill on ideological grounds of federalism.162
Meanwhile, an almost parallel bill was moving through the Senate. On the same day that the House
Committee on Commerce reported H.R. 2130 to the full House, Senator Edmond Spencer Abraham (R-MI)
introduced 106 S. 1561 for consideration, also with an even bipartisan split of cosponsors163. The bill was
referred to the Senate Judiciary committee,164 and was reported to the full Senate on November 18.165 S.
1561 “amended H.R. 2130 to further develop and strengthen the Department of Justice’s focus on GHB
and to provide for the development of forensic ﬁeld tests for the detection of this substance. In all other
respects, the Senate amendments (had) the same eﬀect as the legislation” passed in the House.166 The Senate
amendments had no eﬀect on the bifurcated scheduling of GHB, and once again recognized the importance
of allowing research and possible development of the substance to be used as a prescription treatment for
158145 Cong Rec H 4127; 145 Cong Rec D 946; 145 Cong Rec H 9822.
159106 H.Rpt. 340; Prt 1.
160145 Cong Rec H 9876.
161Bart Stupak Interview, supra note 124.
162146 Cong Rec H 55, 61.
163106 S. 1561; Note: The original short title of the Senate bill was the “Date-Rape Drug Control Act of 1999.” This was
amended on November 19, 1999, to make the title the same as that of the House legislation.
164145 Cong Rec S 10390.
165145 Cong Rec S14805.
166146 Cong Rec H 55, 55.
26cataplexy.167 Once again, the legislation faced no real opposition, and only one day after being referred to
the full Senate, the amended legislation was passed by unanimous consent.168 On January 31, 2000, the
House considered the amended version of the bill under a suspension of the rules, and passed the legislation
by a vote of 339 to 2.169 President Clinton signed the bill into law as Public Law 106-172 on February 18.
As the legislation moved to becoming law, the public oﬃcials involved were clearly focused on the abuses
and deaths resulting from GHB, as per the strategy Orphan adopted for its lobbying eﬀorts. At the same
time, the sponsors of the legislation never lost sight of their goal of making it legal to research and possibly
produce a prescription GHB drug product to treat cataplexy. When speaking on the ﬂoor of the House in
support of the version of the bill as amended by the Senate, Congressman Stupak, one of the original co-
sponsors, took time to especially note that though “the Senate-passed version (did) not speciﬁcally schedule
GHB on the list of controlled substances, but rather instruct(ed) the DEA about how the scheduling should
occur...Congress clearly intends that once GHB is approved by the FDA, the DEA should place the drug
into Schedule III...Only in this way can we ensure that patients who need this drug will have access to it.”
170 Indeed, an example of the balancing the legislators thought they had achieved can be gleaned from the
comments by the original sponsor of the anti-GHB legislation, Representative Jackson-Lee, in support of
passing the ﬁnal bill:
167106 S. 1561.
168145 Cong Rec S 14870.
169146 Cong Rec H 66.
170146 Cong Rec H 55, 60. Despite the Senate amendments, there was no real doubt about how GHB should be scheduled
based on the ﬁnal language of Public Law 106-172, the very language used amended to the bill in the Senate. As the DEA noted
in its ﬁnal rule published on the scheduling of GHB, “Section (3)(a)(1) of Public Law 106-172 directs the Attorney General,
notwithstanding sections 201(a), 201(b), 201(c), and 202 of the CSA (21 U.S.C. 811(a), 811(b), 811(c) and 812), to issue a ﬁnal
order placing GHB in the same schedule as would apply to a scheduling of a substance under section 201(h)(1) of the CSA
(21 U.S.C 811(h)(1)). All substances controlled under 201(h)(1) are placed in Schedule I...Section (3)(a)(1)(B) of Public Law
106-172 directs that a drug product containing GHB for which an application is approved under section 505 of the FFDCA,
shall be placed in the schedule recommended in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph of the DHHS May 19, 1999, letter.
This sentence recommends Schedule III.” 65 Fed. Reg. 13236-37 (March 2000).
27“My position does not mean I am insensitive to the concerns of patients who might be
helped by this drug. This drug has shown some beneﬁts to patients with a speciﬁc form
of narcolepsy in clinical trials, those who suﬀer from sleeping sickness, and for those uses
during trials to try to cure that disease. There is a possibility that GHB can be used
for the treatment of such diseases. We want that to occur, because it is a rare disorder.
We believe that this bill matches the medicinal needs along with the needs to protect
our citizens from the devastation of illegal use of GHB, known to be made in bathtubs
in large amounts. The distribution of this drug would be strictly controlled to ensure
that only patients in need of this drug would have access.”171
Clearly, Orphan and the patients’ groups had accomplished what they set out to do – educate
legislators about both the disease and the possibility for relief that GHB provided, and impress
upon them the importance of allowing further research. As Congressman Stupak said on the ﬂoor
of the House, “this bill recognizes that well-designed legislative eﬀorts should not throw the baby
out with the bathwater, so to speak...the abusive use of GHB we have been focusing on should
not prevent possible legitimate or beneﬁcial uses of the drug.”172 Even President Clinton took
time in his signing statement to speciﬁcally note that the legislation “will not impede ongoing
research into the potential legitimate use of this drug to treat the special needs of those suﬀering
from narcolepsy.”173 The door was now open for Orphan to continue its investigations of GHB’s
potential as a prescription drug, and cataplexy patients around the country could retain their hope
that a treatment for their condition might soon be available.174
To ensure that the door would remain open, Orphan continued its lobbying eﬀorts in the individual states,
many of which do not automatically adopt federal scheduling guidelines. Using a similar strategy of becoming
an advocate for stakeholders such as law-enforcement and rape-crises advocates (and thus establishing the
good-will whereby it could then push for Xyrem to be listed as Schedule III), Orphan continued pushing for
greater controls of illicit GHB as well as stronger rape prevention and punishment laws, while at the same
28time educating state law-makers about the potential beneﬁts of medical GHB.175 As a result of Orphan’s
eﬀorts, as of April 2004, 43 states have adopted the Schedule I / Schedule III bifurcated schedule, while New
Hampshire and Louisiana list GHB as a Schedule II substance, South Dakota lists it as a Schedule III, and
Tennessee lists it as a Schedule IV; only Hawaii and Oklahoma list GHB as a Schedule I substance, thus
precluding the prescription of Xyrem in those two states.176
Risk Management Program for Xyrem
The Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act allowed the Attorney General to establish strict reporting guidelines
for the distribution of a GHB drug product, separate and apart for those required for other controlled
substances.177 Manufacturers could be required to make quarterly reports to the Attorney General on all
acquisition and distribution transactions.178 Moreover, each prescribing practitioner could be required to
maintain ﬁles that would “be available for inspection and copying by the Attorney General” and that in-
cluded, among other things, the prescribing practitioner’s Federal and State registration numbers, veriﬁcation
that the prescribing practitioner possesses the appropriate registration to prescribe the drug product, the
patient’s name and address, the name of the patient’s insurance provider and documentation by a medical
practitioner of the patient’s medical need for the drug.179 These powers were in addition to the powers
already granted to the Attorney General under 21 USC §827, allowing him to require registration and re-
175Bob Gagne Interview, supra note 127.
176Id.
177Pub. L. 106-172, §4
178Id. amending 21 U.S.C. 827, allowing the Attorney General to require reporting of “all manufacturing transactions both
inventory increases, including purchases, transfers, and returns, and reductions from inventory, including sales, transfers, theft,
destruction, and seizure, and shall provide data on material manufactured, manufactured from other material, use in manufac-
turing other material, and use in manufacturing dosage forms.”
179Id.
29porting by manufacturers of various controlled substances. GHB could thus be subject to the strictest and
broadest registration and reporting requirement of almost any controlled substance. While these reporting
requirements were quite onerous compared with those placed on other prescription drugs, Congress was
concerned that “oﬀ-label use could be tremendous,” and wanted to ensure that prescription and distribution
occurred in a very “controlled setting.”180
As part of its eﬀorts to win approval and support for Xyrem, Orphan took its risk management program
to an even higher level, instituting restrictions on distribution that were unprecedented in the industry.181
Although neither the Date-Rape Prohibition Act nor FDA required Orphan to design a closed distribution
system,182 and despite the opposition to such a system from the large National Association of Chain Drug-
stores, Orphan designed the most centralized prescription drug distribution system in the country, largely
on its own initiative.183 The company “began working through the appropriate controls and responsible
use of Xyrem in advance of the (Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act)...(Orphan) did not want the misuse of
a compound to potentially erase the potential of Xyrem for the treatment of cataplexy/narcolepsy. (The
company was) committed to helping these patients without adding to the problem of GHB misuse. That is
why (Orphan) talked with all the essential parties involved to get input on how” best to meet those goals.”184
Orphan consulted with drug diversion investigators, ﬁeld law enforcement, forensics experts, toxicologists,
pharmaceutical distribution experts, and drug abuse trend experts to design a system that would “ensure
that patients who desperately need the medicine can get it...(while keeping) it out of the hands of those
180Bart Stupak Interview, supra note 124.
181E-mail from John Burke, Vice-President, National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators, to Ariel Neuman, Student,
Harvard Law School (Feb.18, 2004, 21:08:43 EST) (on ﬁle with author) [hereinafter John Burke Email].
182Although both the legislation and FDA had placed restrictions on distribution, neither had explicitly required a closed
distribution system – this was Orphan’s idea. Pub. L. 106-172; Marlene Haﬀner Interview, supra note 68.
183Telephone Interview with Kathy Keough, Executive Director, National Association of State Controlled Substance Author-
ities (Feb. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Kathy Keough Interview]; John McCormick Interview, supra note 49.
184David Folken Email, supra note 53.
30people who might abuse it.”185
The distribution system included one single manufacturing plant and one single pharmacy which would be
responsible for distributing all Xyrem prescriptions from around the nation.186 Among those consulted was
the National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators (“NADDI”),187 and the National Association of
State Controlled Substances Authorities (“NASCSA”).188 Orphan invited NADDI and NASCSA represen-
tatives, along with others, to a conference at the special pharmacy and, after a presentation on the proposed
risk-management program, asked them to be critical of the program189 and poke holes in the system.190
Both organizations felt that Orphan was truly interested in getting input and reaching a consensus on an
eﬀective system,191 and according to Orphan, “the input from these groups had a large impact in how the
system was built.”192 NASCSA sent a representative from its board who had both a law enforcement and
regulatory background, and that representative was “blown away” by the security of the program, thinking
that in some respects the controls even amounted to “overkill.”193 The NADDI representatives were equally
impressed with the “unprecedented” restrictions, and had very few, if any, suggestions for improvements to
the system.194 According to John Burke, vice-president of NADDI and one of the representatives sent to
185Patti Engel, Testimony before the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Ad-
visory Committee (June 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3754t1.txt)
[hereinafter Patti Engel Testimony].
186Id.
187NADDI is “is a unique membership organization whose members are responsible for investigating and prosecuting phar-
maceutical drug diversion...NADDI’s principle activities comprise: (1) cooperative education and training in the speciﬁcs of
pharmaceutical drug diversion, investigation, prosecution and prevention; (2) the sharing of investigative information and
communication with a wide variety of interested parties with regard to the nature, scope and impact of pharmaceutical
drug diversion; and (3) the development of more eﬀective measures to combat the problem.” – NADDI, Overview (2004)
at http://www.naddi.org/overview.asp.
188NASCSA’s membership is comprised mainly of state agencies with controlled substances responsibility. Controlled sub-
stances responsibility” includes “the scheduling of controlled substances; the issuance of controlled substances registrations (or
approval for such issuance by another agency); enforcement of state controlled substances acts; responsibility for the admin-
istrative modiﬁcation of controlled substances registrations by means of suspension, revocation, cancellation, probational or
conditional issuance or continuance of registration, or the responsibility for issuance of any professional license which gives the
agency authority to issue, modify, suspend, revoke, or otherwise aﬀect the controlled substances activity of the person or entity
licensed.” – NASCSA, NASCSA Membership (2003) at http://www.nascsa.org/membership.htm.
189John Burke Email, supra note 181.
190Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
191John Burke Email, supra note 181; Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
192David Folken Email, supra note 53.
193Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
194John Burke Email, supra note 181.
31the conference, “The vast majority of the restrictions on Xyrem were already in place when we viewed the
program. It was the most comprehensive program I have ever seen before, or since.”195
As noted, the FDA Advisory Committee that recommended approval of Xyrem for the treatment of cat-
aplexy related to narcolepsy also recommended that a risk management program be adopted before ﬁnal
approval for distribution.196 FDA adopted this proposal and required minor changes to the risk management
program proposed by Orphan at that meeting.197
The ﬁnal distribution and risk-management plan, called the “Xyrem Success Program,” took the following
form:198
Orphan’s sales representatives contact physicians who treat narcolepsy and cataplexy in order to apprise them
of the clinical successes of the drug. Unlike normal sales visits, Orphan does not provide the physician with
any samples. The sale representative then takes the doctor through Orphan’s “Physician Success Program,”
a series of videos, brochures, and pamphlets describing the distribution process, dosing and administration
of Xyrem, home storage and secure handling, and typical drug diversion schemes (in order to make the
physicians aware and alert to the possibility and threat of Xyrem diversion).199 Each physician then has to
sign a statement saying he or she has reviewed the program with the sales representative and understands
it.
195Id.
196Final Minutes of the Food and Drug Administration Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drug Advisory Committee of
June 6, 2001 (available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/minutes/3754m1.htm).
197Press Release, supra note 92.
198This description is taken largely from Patti Engel Testimony, supra note 185, with details conﬁrmed through Telephone
Interview with David Folken, Senior Corporate Communications Specialist, Orphan Medical, Inc. (Mar. 17, 2004).
199Some of the Physician Success Program materials are available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2002/21196lbl.pdf.
32Once a physician determines that a Xyrem prescription is appropriate for a patient, the physician faxes a
special prescription form (provided exclusively by the Orphan sales representative) to the special pharmacy.
The pharmacy then conducts a check on the prescribing physician, utilizing DEA’s National Technical
Information Services (“NTIS”) database to ensure that each physician has an active valid medical license,
and also to ensure that that physician has current prescribing privileges which allow him or her to prescribe
Schedule III medications in this country. As a backup check, the specialty pharmacy also checks with the
appropriate state medical board to determine that there are no pending actions on behalf of the state for
that given physician.
The pharmacy then calls the prescribing physician’s oﬃce to determine that the patient is real and that a
prescription has in fact been written for that patient. At the pharmacy, each patient is assigned a dedicated
pharmacy team who deals with that patient for the duration of the prescription – this allows the patient to
not only get to know and trust the pharmacists, but also allows the pharmacy to more carefully monitor
reﬁll frequency and other tell-tale signs of diversion or abuse. Once insurance reimbursement is obtained,
the pharmacy contacts the patient to determine patient’s location and availability for shipment, and also to
describe the contents of the shipment. These contents include not only the drug product, but also educational
material – Orphan’s “Patient Success Program” – videos, pamphlets, and brochures, designed for patients
that describe the distribution process, dosing and administration information, information on home storage
and handling as well as the criminal and civil penalties assigned to the illicit use of Xyrem, and contact
information for the specialized pharmacy.200
The shipment is then sent utilizing the Rapid Trac System, a unique tracking system that allows real-time
200Some of the materials from the Patient Success Program are available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2002/21196lbl.pdf.
33tracking of the package and delivery only upon an authorized signature by the patient or his or her designee
(arranged ahead of time with the pharmacy). The deliverer makes only one redelivery attempt if the patient
or designee is not available for delivery so as to minimize the time the drug is sitting in a warehouse or on a
delivery truck and thus minimize the chance for diversion. Once the Rapid Trac System shows that delivery
has occurred, specialty pharmacist call the patient within 24 hours to conﬁrm receipt of the package and
again reiterate the information and warnings about home storage and handling, as well as the penalties for
illicit use.
Post-Approval
The one consistent critic of Xyrem, the approval process, and the risk management program, is Trinka
Poratta, the director of ProjectGHB.org.201 The website is dedicated to educating the public about the
dangers of GHB, preventing GHB abuse, and providing a forum for recovering GHB-abusers and victims of
GHB-related date-rapes to share stories and warn others of the dangers posed by the drug.202 Ms. Poratta,
a former LAPD oﬃcer who testiﬁed before both Congress and the FDA Advisory Committee, claims, among
other things, that “FDA was bought and paid for by Orphan,”203 that the risk management program is
a case of “the fox guarding the hen house,”204 that Orphan is pushing the oﬀ-label use of Xyrem,205 that
many Orphan “investors are GHB addicts/pushers,”206 and that the only patients pushing for approval
were paid for by Orphan and most are not interested in the drug.207 Orphan responds to these allegations
201Comprehensive document research, as well as interviews with representatives from Orphan, NADDI, NASCSA, Narcolepsy
Network, and the US Congress, did not reveal any other critics of the drug or its approval with the required restrictions.
202Project GHB, About, at http://www.projectghb.org/about.htm.
203E-mail from Trinka Poratta, Director, Projectghb.org, to Ariel Neuman, Student, Harvard Law School (Feb. 18, 2004,
21:20:26 PST) (on ﬁle with author).
204Id.
205Id.
206Id.
207E-mail from Trinka Poratta, Director, Projectghb.org, to Ariel Neuman, Student, Harvard Law School (Feb. 18, 2004,
15:21:23 PST) (on ﬁle with author).
34by saying that “we have conducted and provided years of clinical research which has been evaluated by
numerous experts in the ﬁeld and obviously by FDA and they have clearly felt that Xyrem is a safe and
eﬀective medication when used appropriately. Law enforcement experts have been extremely supportive
of our system and eﬀorts. We’ve taken a very responsible approach in making sure this medicine is used
appropriately and believe that her allegations are oﬀ-base.”208 John Burke of NADDI says that Ms. Poratta
is unwilling to admit that her predictions “turned out to be incorrect,” and characterized her as a “zealot
when it comes to GHB.”209 NASCSA Executive Director Kathy Keough, to whose organization Ms. Poratta
made a presentation on GHB and “club drugs” to its members, characterized Ms. Poratta as an “extremist”
with “blinders on” who “didn’t even want to imagine possibly that a company could try and do the right
thing.”210 Indeed, upon request Ms. Poratta could not provide any information which could be conﬁrmed
in order to back up her claims.211
Instead, according to almost all interested parties the Xyrem risk management program has in fact been a
success. Since success in this instance is deﬁned, as it was beginning with the Date-Rape Prohibition Act,
as preventing diversion while allowing appropriate patient access, the fact that both law enforcement and
patient advocates laud the system is a telling sign that the program is working. This does not, of course,
mean that the ﬁght against abuse of non-pharmaceutical GHB has been won; the number of emergency room
visits involving GHB or GBL from industrial or other sources continues to rise every year as abuse continues
to grow.212 However, according to John Burke, vice-president of the NADDI, Orphan’s risk management
208David Folken Email, supra note 53.
209John Burke Email, supra note 181.
210Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
211While one must note that almost all of the information available on Xyrem, its approval process, and the Congressional
legislation is from sources whom Ms. Poratta criticizes and regards as untrustworthy, this is largely because she has criticized
almost every party involved in the process. Although she seems to be the lone critc of Xyrem, Orphan, and the FDA in this
instance, and despite her apparent lack of credibility on this issue, her work related to educating the public about the dangers
of GHB and her attempts to prevent abuse of the drug are lauded by Orphan, NADDI, and NASCSA. Because of the prominent
role she played in the debate over the approval of Xyrem, and because of her status as the sole critic, it is important to at least
note her objections and criticisms.
212National Drug Intelligence Center, US Dept. of Justice, Information Bulletin: GHB Analogs (August 2002) at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs1/1621/index.htm.
35“program is a success. It appears that only legitimate patients are receiving the drug, I know of no diversion
incidents, or if there have been, extremely rare. I attribute (the success) primarily to the company’s eﬀorts in
setting up the program...it is an extraordinary program.”213 Kathy Keough, Executive Director of NASCSA,
says that she also has “not heard of a single case where there has been pharmaceutical grade GHB ending
up on the street.” She attributes this largely to the success of the risk management program.214 Indeed, Ms.
Keough states that although she and her organization often pick up “rumblings” oﬀ the street before a larger
drug abuse problem explodes, NASCSA is hearing nothing regarding any potential diversion of Xyrem.215
The program’s unique features allows for identiﬁcation of any type of unusual behavior, such as duplicate
prescriptions, attempts at over-prescribing, or any attempts at over-use by the patient. The Rapid Trac
System allows investigators to pinpoint the moment and location where a package is lost, if such an event
were to occur.216 At the same time, according to Bob Cloud, former Director of the Narcolepsy Network,217
“people are getting the medication they need.”218 This assessment is supported by the continually growing
number of patients receiving Xyrem, which by November 2003 had reached 3,488 in just over a year.219
Moreover, the numbers further undermine Ms. Poratta’s claims. Within a year of Xyrem’s commercial
launch, 9,236 monthly prescriptions had been shipped, 15,758 prescription bottles had been shipped, and
there had been six identiﬁed physician incidents and nine identiﬁed patient incidents.220 The physician
213John Burke Email, supra note 181.
214Kathy Keough, supra note 183.
215Id.
216Patti Engel Testimony, supra note 185.
217The Narcolepsy Network is an organization whose membership is comprised of “people who have narcolepsy or related sleep
disorders, such as Idiopathic Hypersomnia, their families and friends, and professionals involved in treatment, research, and pub-
lic education regarding narcolepsy.” – Narcolepsy Network, Narcolepsy Network, Inc. at http://www.narcolepsynetwork.org.
218Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
219Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical Issues Record Xyrem r  Prescriptions Update (Nov. 20, 2003)
available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=420.
220NASCSA held an educational conference in October 2003. At that conference, Pam Stahl, Orphan’s Vice Presi-
dent of Commercial Operations, gave a presentation on the company’s experience with Xyrem-related incidents in the
year since the drug’s commercial launch. Pam Stahl, Presentation to NASCSA 2003 Conference (Oct. 21-25, 2003), at
36incidents included four prescribing physicians who lacked the appropriate DEA license, and two people
posing as physicians.221 The patient incidents included one sexual assault of a medicated patient by a family
member,222 one accidental overdose,223 three cases of misuse/abuse,224 and four cases of lost or stolen
products.225 During the same period 148 new prescriptions were cancelled because the Pharmacy could not
contact the patient, 37 new prescriptions were put on hold because the Pharmacy could not contact patient,
and 32 prescription reﬁlls were cancelled because the Pharmacy could not contact patient.226 Kathy Keough,
Executive Director of NASCSA, evaluated these numbers as evidence that Orphan was doing a “fantastic
job ensuring that (Xyrem) does not end up on the street.”227
The question as Orphan moves forward is whether it can sustain its success at keeping diversion incidents
at or close to zero. Orphan continues its exploration into using Xyrem as a treatment for daytime sleepiness
in narcolepsy patients,228 though this would still keep the number of patients being prescribed Xyrem fairly
small. More worrisome for some of those concerned with possible diversion is Xyrem, Orphan is currently
exploring submitting an IND to FDA to study Xyrem as a treatment for ﬁbromyalgia.229 Fibromyalgia
is estimated to aﬄict about 2% of the general population,230 meaning that if approved, Xyrem would
http://www.nascsa.org/confer2003.htm.
221Id.
222Patient moved to new home and continues to take Xyrem.
223The overdose was traced to a broken piba dispenser on the prescription bottle, and the dispenser was subsequently redesigned
by Orphan.
224All of the patients’ prescriptions were discontinued.
225One package disappeared after being left at a house without the FedEx deliverer obtaining a signature, another disappeared
after being mistakenly left in a hotel room, another was stolen after the patient’s car was broken into, and a fourth was
mistakenly discarded by a hospital pharmacy that was treating a patient for unrelated medical needs and was charged with
dispensing all of his medication, including Xyrem. All four patients who reported these incidents were allowed to continue
their prescriptions but under monitoring by the Pharmacy, with no further incidents reported for any of them. – Pam Stahl,
Presentation to NASCSA 2003 Conference (Oct. 21-25, 2003), at http://www.nascsa.org/confer2003.htm.
226Id.
227Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
228National Institute of Health, Trial Comparing Eﬀects of Xyrem taken Orally and Modaﬁnil with Placebo in Treating
Daytime Sleepiness in Narcolepsy (April 14, 2004), at http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/show/NCT00066170?order=1.
229Xyrem Assessed as Treatment for Symptoms of Fibromyalgia Syndrome, Drug Week, Oct. 3, 2003, at 138. Fibromyalgia
syndrome is a widespread musculoskeletal pain and fatigue disorder for which the cause is still unknown. Fibromyalgia means
pain in the muscles, ligaments, and tendons – the soft ﬁbrous tissues in the body. – Fibromyalgia Network website accessed at
http://www.fmnetnews.com/pages/basics.html
230Dayton Reardon Interview, supra note 46.
37theoretically be available to a much larger segment of the population than the.05% aﬀected by narcolepsy. If
Orphan were able to maintain the Xyrem Success Program in the face of this potential increase in prescription
volume, neither representatives of NADDI or NASCSA fear that diversion would increase.231 At the same
time, the question exists as to whether such a small company would be able to continue such restricted
distribution on a larger scale.232 The system is extraordinarily expensive – indeed, neither Xyrem nor Orphan
as a whole have yet proved proﬁtable, in large part because of the costs of the risk management program
(though also due to ongoing clinical costs for Xyrem and Orphan’s other drug products).233 According
to Orphan, while “the current system would be a possibility for the eventual approval and subsequent
distribution of Xyrem for a ﬁbromyalgia indication,”234 even the company admits that most likely if it “ever
gets into a big market the central distribution is going to change.”235 The company treats this as a “bridge to
cross in the future,”236 and a decision that will require further discussion both internally and with FDA.237
Nonetheless, Orphan’s plan is to always at least continue the physician and patient registry in order to be
able to identify potential abusers, physician-impersonators, and doctor-shopping.238 At the same time,
the concerns about GHB abuse and diversion have not abated, and winning approval from FDA, DEA, and
others to change its distribution system may in fact be more diﬃcult than Orphan would like to think.239
Conclusion
231Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183; John Burke E-mail, supra note 181.
232Kathy Keough Interview, supra note 183.
233David Folken Email, supra note 53.
234Id.
235Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
236Id.
237David Folken Email, supra note 53.
238Bob Cloud Interview, supra note 19.
239See, e.g. 68 FR 66048-66052, proposed rulemaking by DEA for “additional recordkeeping and reporting requirements for
drug products containing” GHB.
38In the end, GHB’s path to legitimacy is the story of government agencies, the US Congress, patient groups,
and a good corporate citizen, working together to make sure citizens are both protected and treated. Along
the way all sides were forced to compromise, but the compromises resulted in programs that are keeping
pharmaceutical grade GHB oﬀ the street while ensuring that patients get the treatment they need. This is
an instance were politics, law enforcement, and medicine had the opportunity to collide, but instead melded
into a useful structure that satisﬁed almost all parties involved. As Orphan moves forward with its studies
and hopes for wider distribution, one can only hope that the system continues to operate as smoothly and
productively as it has thus far.240
240Note: Orphan recently announced that it had licensed the European sales and marketing rights to Celltech Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. Press Release, Orphan Medical, Inc., Orphan Medical Licenses European Sales And Marketing Rights For Xyrem r  To
Celltech Pharmaceuticals, (Oct. 30, 2003) available at http://www.orphan.com/articledetail.cfm?aid=4&id=417.
According to Celltech, “GHB has been scheduled by the International Narcotics Control Board (http://www.incb.org)
as a schedule 4 drug, and this is also the classiﬁcation it has received from the European member states.
“In the UK, GHB represents a Schedule IV part I substance. Written Home Oﬃce authority is required to produce,
supply or possess Schedule IV Part I drugs. Licenses are required for the import and export of Schedule 4 Part I drugs. Records
of the supply and distribution of GHB must be kept and preserved, and also records of destruction must be kept and preserved
by the license holder. Schedule IV Part I substances do not require handwritten prescriptions nor are subject to safe custody
requirements.
“Since Xyrem (sodium oxybate) has not yet been submitted to the EMEA for central regulatory review, we do not know
whether any additional restrictions to the above will be placed on the product by the EMEA itself, or by the members states.
A pan-European license will be granted to Xyrem upon approval of the Marketing Authorization Application. As National
legislation controlling the supply and distribution of controlled substances varies, the European Commission may apply some
standard measures, but as Xyrem represents the ﬁrst Controlled substance to be reviewed via the Centralized Procedure, it is
not possible to predict whether National levels of control will be considered adequate.
“GHB was assigned a Schedule IV substance by the 32nd WHO Expert Committee on Drug dependence, and thus the National
levels of control applicable to Schedule IV substances will apply.”
– E-mail from Elanor Hunt, Business Development Manager, Celltech Pharmaceuticals, to Ariel Neuman, Student, Harvard
Law School (Mar. 15, 2004, 17:13:11 GMT) (on ﬁle with author).
39